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INTRODUCTION  
The case of Knick v. Township of Scott1 risks becoming a fairy tale 
of the frightening kind if we fail to put it into perspective.  With Knick, 
the U.S. Supreme Court cast aside the second prong of the ripeness 
test, overruling a 34-year-old precedent that a takings claimant had to 
first seek compensation in the state courts under state law before going 
to federal court.  One perspective on the decision was that “Knick may 
result in the crowding of federal courts, through which myriad takings 
claims stemming from local regulations of zoning and land use may 
now pass unencumbered.”2  Whether that will hold true is yet to be 
seen.  In establishing a foundation on which to analyze Knick’s likely 
impacts on local governments (including inundation of the federal 
 
* Dwight Merriam is a lawyer and planner in Connecticut. www.dwightmerriam.com. 
He is past President of the American Institute of Certified Planners, a Fellow of AICP, 
a Fellow of the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, a Counselor of Real Estate, 
and the Connecticut Member of Owners’ Counsel of America. He has published 13 
books, including co-editing Rathkopf’s Law of Zoning and Planning. B.A., (cum 
laude), University of Massachusetts; M.R.P., University of North Carolina; J.D., Yale 
Law School. 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 2. Fifth Amendment — Takings Clause — State Litigation Requirement — Knick 
v. Township of Scott, 133 HARV. L. REV. 322, 330 (2019). 
640 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
courts) — my self-assigned task — it is necessary to establish a certain 
gravitas.  I start with the story of Chicken Little. 
I. LEARNING FROM A FABLE 
If you want to get technical about it, believe it or not, there is a 
formal typology of fables3 in which the story of Chicken Little is 
categorized: the Aarne-Thompson-Uther type 20C (including former 
type 2033).4 It is one of a class of folktales where the lesson is that we 
should not overreact or be led into hysteria over the littlest thing.  It is 
the hapless Chicken Little, as you will fondly recall, who is hit on the 
head with an acorn and, believing the sky is falling, becomes hysterical 
and decides that he must tell the King.5  Along the way, Chicken Little 
runs into a string of characters, all with delightfully rhyming names, 
such as Henny Penny, Ducky Lucky, Drakey Lakey, Turkey Lurkey, 
Goosey Loosey a.k.a. Loosey Goosey,6 and Foxey Loxey, among 
others.  Chicken Little recruits them all, one after another, and they 
join him in the quest to tell the King, allowing the storyteller an 
opportunity to repeat all of the names each time a character joins them, 
as they troop along.  The cumulative or chain tale7 dates back to long 
before it was first written down, probably by the Brothers Grimm in 
1812.8 
 
 3. See Cara Giaimo, The ATU Fable Index: Like the Dewey Decimal System, But 
with More Ogres, CHILD. LITERATURE WK. (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/aarne-thompson-uther-tale-type-index-fables-
fairy-tales [https://perma.cc/H9AQ-7DDP]. 
 4. D.L. Ashliman, The End of the World, UNIV. PITT.: FOLKLORE & MYTHOLOGY: 
ELECTRONIC TEXTS, http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type2033.html 
[https://perma.cc/UU3U-ZX64]. 
 5. An average acorn weighs 4.0–9.5 grams. See Jerry Tecklin & Douglas 
McCreary, Acorn Size as a Factor in Early Seedling Growth of Blue Oaks, in U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON OAK WOODLANDS AND 
HARDWOOD RANGELAND MANAGEMENT 48 (1991), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.584.8359&rep=rep1&type=
pdf [https://perma.cc/786U-B6BA]. 
 6. “Loosey Goosey” is defined in Merriam-Webster as an adjective, “notably 
loose or relaxed: not tense.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/loosey-goosey [https://perma.cc/3FZL-JND5] (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2020). 
 7. Old MacDonald Had a Farm is another example of the chain or cumulative tale 
that repeats itself and is iterative. Old MacDonald Had a Farm, SECONDHANDSONGS, 
https://secondhandsongs.com/work/171732 [https://perma.cc/EKH9-D2J2] (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2020). 
 8. See JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, CHILDREN’S AND HOUSEHOLD TALES 
(1812). A second volume was published in 1815. See Mari Ness, The Sky Is Falling! 
Maybe! “Henny Penny” or “Chicken Little”, TOR.COM (May 5, 2016, 2:00 P.M.), 
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You see, the law can be fun; you are smiling already, and we have 
not yet arrived at the serious business at hand.  Most interesting is how 
the tale ends.  In one version, the fox eats them all.  In another, one 
character survives long enough to warn and save Chicken Little.  And 
in yet a third version, they are all saved. 
With Knick, the end of the story is likely to be happy enough: the 
sky will not fall, and all can be saved.  Why?  Because, as we shall see, 
in all of the other landmark direct and indirect condemnation cases, the 
consequences have proved mostly unremarkable.  Even so, it is 
essential to know the path forward in light of the new precedent in 
Knick. 
II. WE HAVE BEEN HERE BEFORE 
After each successive Supreme Court decision on property rights, 
we have imagined a parade of horribles that ultimately never appeared.  
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County 
of Los Angeles, the Court held that property owners must be 
compensated with money damages for their lost property from the time 
of the taking, even when the taking is temporary.9 
The report of the decision, the day after it was handed down, was 
mostly doom and gloom: “The decision will chill the zeal of local, state, 
and Federal regulators of land use around the nation and encourage 
property owners to seek damages when they feel they have been 
unduly burdened by regulations . . . .”10  A New York Times article less 
than two weeks after the decision reported on the concern of local and 
state planners and suggested trouble ahead: 
Under the Court’s ruling, governmental agencies could be made to 
pay potentially huge amounts rather than simply amending a 
regulation after it is struck down by a court.  The action not only raises 
sharply the financial stakes involved in zoning and other land-use 
decisions, but has also caused many experts to agree that it could lead 
to a new era of caution in the imposition of controls on private 
property.11 
 
https://www.tor.com/2016/05/05/the-sky-is-falling-maybe-henny-penny-or-chicken-
little/ [https://perma.cc/KB5M-GDDG]. 
 9. 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987). 
 10. Stuart Taylor Jr., High Court Backs Rights of Owners in Land-Use Suits, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 10, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/10/us/high-court-backs-
rights-of-owners-in-land-use-suits.html [https://perma.cc/SBZ9-LYLV]. 
 11. Robert A. Hamilton, U.S. Land-Use Ruling Causing Concern, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/21/nyregion/us-land-use-ruling-
causing-concern.html [https://perma.cc/SY73-QS9T]. 
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Looking back at First English over 30 years later, it is impossible to 
see any measurable, adverse impact on governmental decision-making, 
planning, and land-use regulation arising from the decision.  Most 
certainly, there have been more cases brought for compensation for 
temporary takings,12 more money damages paid in California that 
otherwise would not have been paid,13 and more favorable settlements 
for property owners,14 but nowhere is there any report or evidence of 
any dramatic change.  Indeed, decisions applying First English impose 
serious limitations on its application in those instances where permits 
are not quickly forthcoming, requiring that claimants allege and prove 
that their temporary takings are “extraordinary” and not merely the 
result of normal delays.15 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council,16 five years after First English, was subject to the same initial 
overreaction.  Norman Williams, Jr., one of the great land-use law 
scholars in my lifetime, authored a two-part analysis of the decision, 
calling it the “culmination of a trend” that would end the presumption 
of validity established in the state courts.17  That did not happen.  A 
recent study of the 1700 post-Lucas decisions citing Lucas revealed that 
in only a minuscule 1.6% of the cases (just 27 of them) was the plaintiff 
property owner victorious.18  The Lucas decision never even made a 
tremendous makeweight argument. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Caquelin v. United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 564 (2018) (temporary taking 
for interim trail use). 
 13. See, e.g., Rossco Holdings Inc. v. California, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 14. See Michelle Casady, Long Road Remains Ahead After Hurricane Taking 
Ruling, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1229587/long-road-
remains-ahead-after-hurricane-takings-ruling [https://perma.cc/S9Q8-SVJE] (more 
favorable settlements likely following favorable court ruling). The temporary taking 
caused by a moratorium led to a year-long negotiation in an attempt to settle the claim, 
but it ultimately failed. See Tedra Fox, Lake Tahoe’s Temporary Development 
Moratorium: Why a Stitch in Time Should Not Define the Property Interest in a 
Takings Claim, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399 (2011). 
 15. See, e.g., Landgate v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998) (two-year 
delay not a taking); LXR RS V, LLC v. Municipality of Norristown, No. 2: 19-cv-01397-
JDW, 2019 WL 4930157 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2019) (“The Supreme Court, however, 
has ruled that decreases in the value of property during governmental deliberations, 
absent an extraordinary delay, are mere incidents of ownership and do not constitute 
a regulatory taking.” (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980))). 
 16. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 17. See Dwight Merriam, No, Norman, The Sky Is Not Falling, Zoning & Plan. L. 
Rep., Jul.–Aug. 1993. 
 18. See Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth 
Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 103, 
116 (2016). 
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And then there is the notorious Kelo v. City of New London19 
eminent domain decision from 2005, legally doing nothing more than 
restating settled law, but causing such enormous angst.  The decision 
galvanized the masses into action when they saw how draconian 
eminent domain could be.  The result was that 44 states changed their 
constitutions or statutes to address issues of what was a public use or 
purpose, what properties might be protected from being taken, and 
what compensation was fair.20  Call it “losing the battle and winning 
the war.”21  If anything, Kelo is exemplary of how politics can be 
profoundly affected by a decision, even though the law has not 
changed.22 
III. FIRST REACTIONS TO KNICK 
As to Knick v. Township of Scott, it appears we have more of the 
same: overreaction, hyperbole, prognostications without foundation, 
and idle speculation.  For instance, shortly after the decision, U.S. 
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse saw Knick as part of a 73-case campaign 
by the “Roberts Five,” as he labels them, supported by “dark money” 
intent on “seeking control of our courts.”23  As Rhode Island Attorney 
General in 2001, Senator Whitehouse had lost a seemingly-
consequential Supreme Court takings case, Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island.24  Palazzolo was yet another case where the decision eliminating 
 
 19. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See generally DWIGHT MERRIAM & MARY MASSARON, 
EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT (2006). 
 20. 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation since 
Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card 
[https://perma.cc/W8K3-NZX6] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
 21. Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (to Public), N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/weekinreview/the-nation-case-won-on-appeal-
to-public.html [https://perma.cc/GZ4L-YVV8]. 
 22. It has been argued that some state courts have ignored Kelo and continued a 
trend toward greater protection of private property owners. See Ilya Somin, The 
Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (introduction to the 
Symposium on Eminent Domain in the United States); see also Patricia E. Salkin, The 
Kelo-Effect in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Assessing the Impact of Kelo 
in the Tri-State Region (Albany Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-06, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028893 
[https://perma.cc/W3DY-CSZU]. 
 23. Sheldon Whitehouse, ‘Knick’-Picking: Why a Recent SCOTUS Ruling Signals 
a New Day, NAT’L L.J. (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/01/knick-picking-why-a-recent-
scotus-ruling-signals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/7TJM-ZGQB]. 
 24. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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the notice defense in takings seemed momentous at the time,25 yet 
proved to have no real effect.  The doctrine of investment-backed 
expectations slid in, for the most part, to take its place.26  It appears 
Senator Whitehouse cannot put the loss behind him: “Front groups 
funded by anonymous money manufacture legal controversies, like the 
Pacific Legal Foundation, which handpicked the plaintiff in Knick and 
shepherded the litigation to the high court.  I happen to know a thing 
or two about them.  They led the litigation in Palazzolo.”27  The 
involvement of the Pacific Legal Foundation in both Knick and 
Palazzolo is probably indicative of nothing more than it being a large 
nonprofit legal organization that defends private property rights, with 
73 lawyers and staff and 170 active cases in 2018.28  As I noted in my 
response to Senator Whitehouse’s commentary, some pro-regulation, 
government planning, and land-use control advocates, such as 
Professor Daniel R. Mandelker of Washington University School of 
Law, had strongly advocated overruling the second prong of ripeness 
in Williamson County.29 
In his commentary, Senator Whitehouse also disparaged the Chief 
Justice and the rest of the “Roberts Five”: “The chief justice likes to 
 
 25. See id. The Court ruled five to four that the owner of 20 acres of Rhode Island 
waterfront property had the right to go to court to challenge development restrictions 
even though the restrictions were in place when he acquired the property. Advocates 
of property rights hailed the decision as a substantial victory. See also Linda 
Greenhouse, Justices Rein in Local Regulation of Tobacco Ads, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 
2001) https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/29/us/supreme-court-supreme-court-
roundup-justices-rein-local-regulation-tobacco-ads.html [https://perma.cc/GT5T-
GEDY]. 
 26. See, e.g., Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, 821 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2018) (reasonable investment-backed expectations). 
 27. See Whitehouse, supra note 23. See my reply at Dwight Merriam, Viewpoint: 
Senator Is Wrong About ‘Knick’ Ruling, CONN. L. TRIB. (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2019/07/02/viewpoint-senator-is-wrong-about-
knick-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/R2D5-UFFH]; see also James Burling, Sen. 
Whitehouse Is Wrong About Public Interest Law, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 4, 
2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/10/04/sen-whitehouse-is-wrong-
about-public-interest-law/?slreturn=20190929134733 [https://perma.cc/JQY9-J2NU]. 
Anthony Palazzolo became my friend. I came to know him in interviewing him for my 
writings. He was a junk and scrap dealer who studied the law. He knew more about the 
leading takings cases and the line-up of the justices and their views than I will ever 
know. He was a wonderful man. 
 28. PAC. LEGAL FOUND., https://pacificlegal.org [https://perma.cc/NY7R-CVEH] 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
 29. See Merriam, supra note 27; see also Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n 
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson County established 
the two-prong test for determining the ripeness of a federal takings claim, requiring (1) 
a final decision by the entity enacting the regulation (the finality prong); and (2) that 
the plaintiff sought compensation first from the state (the compensation prong). Id. 
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say his court isn’t partisan; that’s because people believing that helps 
him be partisan.  But it’s actually worse.  The Roberts Five have 
become virtual delivery boys for big Republican donor interests, 
almost daring us to point out the obvious pattern.”30  As with his attack 
on the Pacific Legal Foundation and indirectly on Professor 
Mandelker, Senator Whitehouse’s claim that Republican donors have 
turned the “Roberts Five” into “virtual delivery boys” is 
unsubstantiated and misses the mark. 
Cogent, yet probably exaggerated, speculation on the impacts of 
Knick was made the day of the decision by the dissenters, in an opinion 
written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor.  They identify three adverse impacts of the decision.  First, 
they believe that “it will inevitably turn even well-meaning government 
officials into lawbreakers” who “will almost inescapably become 
constitutional malefactors.”31  What they mean is that because takings 
are now deemed to occur at the moment the property is 
unconstitutionally encumbered and before a court may render a 
decision on whether it is a taking or not, the public official is put in an 
untenable position.  However, is this not essentially the same situation 
a police officer is in when making a stop or a zoning enforcement 
officer when issuing a cease and desist order to remove a sign?  The 
civil rights violation occurs at the moment of action. 
Second, the dissenters argue, correctly, that it is “more important” 
that the federal courts may be overwhelmed with run-of-the-mill local 
land-use controversies.  They write that “the majority’s ruling channels 
to federal courts a (potentially massive) set of cases that more properly 
belongs, at least in the first instance, in state courts — where 
Williamson County put them.”32  Furthermore, the dissenters state: 
“Today’s decision sends a flood of complex state-law issues to federal 
courts.  It makes federal courts a principal player in local and state 
land-use disputes.  It betrays judicial federalism.”33  This may well 
prove to be true, to some limited extent. 
Finally, the dissenters express concerns about the apparent 
disregard for the doctrine of stare decisis in overturning precedent 
 
 30. See Whitehouse, supra note 23. In my response, I addressed some of the issues 
I saw in Whitehouse’s commentary, pointing out that pro-government types like 
Professor Daniel R. Mandelker have supported overturning Williamson County for 
decades. See Merriam, supra note 27. 
 31. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 2189. 
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dating back 34 years.34  One could argue that it is not an issue of stare 
decisis to overturn a wrongly-decided case.  Regardless, the question 
of whether setting aside Williamson County’s second prong of ripeness 
violates the principle of stare decisis and portends decisions to overturn 
other precedent is not central to the decision’s impact on local 
governments.35  The reality is that Williamson County had already 
been weakened and was identified by some as wrongly-decided, or at 
least proven to be ill-considered and impractical in its application. 
The Court first weakened the precedent in 1997 in Suitum v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, where it characterized the compensation 
prong in Williamson County as merely prudential, not a jurisdictional 
rule.36  Then, in 2005 in San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of 
San Francisco, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned Williamson 
County’s compensation prong in a concurring opinion joined by 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas: 
It is not clear to me that Williamson County was correct in demanding 
that, once a government entity has reached a final decision with 
respect to a claimant’s property, the claimant must seek 
compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim in 
federal court . . . . I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson 
County.  But further reflection and experience lead me to think that 
the justifications for its state-litigation requirement are suspect, while 
its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic.  Here, no court below has 
addressed the correctness of Williamson County, neither party has 
asked us to reconsider it, and resolving the issue could not benefit 
petitioners.  In an appropriate case, I believe the Court should 
reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings 
claim based on the final decision of a state or local government entity 
must first seek compensation in state courts.37 
Some see the recent Knick decision as part of a larger and longer 
process of moving the Court to the right.38  Some people say that the 
recent overturning of precedent is a lead up to overturning Roe v. 
 
 34. See id. at 2181–90. 
 35. See id. at 2190. 
 36. 520 U.S. 725, 733–34 (1997); see also J. David Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal 
Takings Review: The Courts’ “Prudential” Answer to Williamson County’s Flawed 
State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REV. 319, 320 (2014); Thomas 
Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in Federal Court: The State Compensation 
Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24 URB. LAW. 479, 482–83 (1992). 
 37. 545 U.S. 323, 349, 352 (2005). 
 38. See Jimmy Hoover, Inside the Supreme Court’s Playbook on Precedent, 
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1206353/inside-the-supreme-
court-s-playbook-on-precedent [https://perma.cc/8URV-68ZM]. 
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Wade.39  However, how could one possibly know that, or even imagine 
some sort of silent conspiracy among a group of justices? 
IV. THE LIKELY IMPACTS OF KNICK ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Thinking through the implications of Knick, with only a little case 
law so far applying it, and with a measure of caution about the risk of 
over-reaching, below are the likely impacts on local government.  None 
are greatly adverse, and some are helpful for the government.  Is it 
possible that the Knick decision in some respects will be a win-win for 
all the stakeholders? 
More Takings Cases Will Be Brought to Federal Court 
It is easy to predict that more takings cases will be brought to federal 
court.  The question is, how many?  Since everyone can now go to 
federal court,40 some claimants who otherwise would have felt 
compelled to start in state court will start in federal court.  Some people 
who see Knick as generally a “pro-property rights” case will be 
encouraged to commence an action. 
Some practitioners have said they will still likely go to state court 
with their constitutionality issues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply 
because they believe in some cases the state forum will be more 
favorable.41  As Professor John Echeverria of Vermont Law School 
sees it: 
In terms of practical implications for future takings litigation, 
the Knick decision unquestionably gives property owners significant 
new tactical advantages.  In particular, the option to select either a 
federal or state forum will allow claimants to forum shop based on 
which one offers the most favorable precedent or is more likely to 
provide a probable plaintiff-friendly judge.42 
 
 39. See Precedent and the Roberts Court in 4 Charts, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1207062/precedent-and-the-roberts-court-in-4-charts 
[https://perma.cc/E8VY-THLJ]. 
 40. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177, 2179. 
 41. This is the collective view of the many lawyers with whom I have discussed the 
impacts, particularly those fellow members of Owners’ Counsel of America. See 
OWNERS’ COUNS. AM., www.ownerscounsel.com [https://perma.cc/HW44-8NVH] (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2020). It is believed that, in some instances, federal courts will be less 
interested in what may be characterized as issues of local land use, and state courts may 
be more sympathetic to property owners. The decision on whether to bring the action 
in state or federal court will vary from state to state depending upon the culture and 
common law. 
 42. John Echeverria, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Procedural Boost for Takings 
Claimants, 2020 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES 51. 
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I doubt there will be a “flood” of cases to federal court.  Nothing in 
the case reports suggests this, at least thus far, five months after the 
Knick decision.  Professor Ilya Somin of George Mason University 
Scalia Law School has speculated on whether there will be a “flood” of 
new cases.  He concludes that the idea there will be a “flood” of new 
cases is overstated and that if there are many new cases in federal court 
it “would indicate that state courts (at least in some parts of the 
country) have been severely underprotecting property owners’ 
constitutional rights, taking advantage of the Williamson County 
regime to deny takings claims that federal courts would have upheld.”43 
At this early time after the Knick decision, the extent to which there 
may be a “flood” or even a “spurt” of new cases is speculative. 
A Wider Range of Takings Claims May Be Seen 
Beyond an increase in the number of takings claims brought, the 
range of governmental activities claimed to effect a taking may widen, 
particularly with facial claims that do not require a federal court to 
apply decision-making criteria on site-specific challenges.44 
The Pleading Process Will Become More Complicated: Can You Say 
“Twiqbal ”? 
If “Twiqbal ”45 is a foreign term to you and you cannot pronounce 
it, you are not alone (I confess to both until I was forced into it by 
Knick46).  The holdings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly47 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal have been colloquially referred to as “Twiqbal.”48  
Through these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court created a “plausibility 
standard” for courts to use in evaluating factual allegations at the 
pleading stage.49  It is plain that claimants are now going to have to be 
more specific, and government lawyers need to be prepared to know 
what they can demand in pleading.  For over four decades I have said 
 
 43. See Ilya Somin, Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a “Catch 22” that Barred 
Takings Cases from Federal Court, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 153, 183–84 
(2019). 
 44. Before the decision in Knick, courts were split on whether facial claims were 
exempt under the state-litigation requirements of Williamson County, but now both 
as-applied and facial claims are clearly exempt. See Petworth Holdings, LLC v. 
Bowser, No. CV 18-3 (JEB), 2019 WL 4889274, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2019). 
 45. Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 744 (2016). 
 46. My license plate “number” is “ZONING” (really), not 
“COMPLEXFEDERALCIVILPROCEDURE.” 
 47. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 48. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 49. See generally Bartholomew, supra note 45. 
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to my clients, “We must never fear the facts.  They are what they are.”  
If someone does not have a good takings claim, they should not bring 
it.  If the government cannot defend its actions, it should settle.  The 
pleading process can help both sides know where they are vulnerable 
and hopefully lead to resolutions short of trial.  “Twiqbal ” pleading 
may be able to help us get there. 
More Problems with Pendent Jurisdiction Are Inevitable 
As federal courts increasingly hear local land-use cases with state 
law issues, more argument will be had on whether the court will take 
pendent jurisdiction of the state claims.50  A federal district court 
recently described ancillary and pendent jurisdiction principles in an 
inverse condemnation case: 
 Federal courts follow the principles of ancillary and pendent 
jurisdiction, under which a court’s original jurisdiction over a federal 
claim “carries with it jurisdiction over state law claims that ‘derive 
from a common nucleus of operative fact,’ such that the relationship 
between the federal claim and the state claim permits the conclusion 
that the entire action before the court comprises but one 
constitutional ‘case.’”  These principles have been codified under a 
single “supplemental jurisdiction” statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under 
that statute, “in any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction,” district courts have supplemental jurisdiction 
“over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within 
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy” under Article III of the Constitution. 
 Supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, however, and § 1367 
reflects this discretion. Accordingly, a federal court may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if 1) “the claim raises 
a novel or complex issue of State law,” 2) “the claim substantially 
predominates over the claim or claims” subject to the district court’s 
original jurisdiction, 3) “the district court has dismissed all claims over 
 
 50. See, e.g., E&B Nat. Res. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 18-CV-05857-
YGR, 2019 WL 5697912 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019); Little v. Mayor & City Council of 
Ocean City, No. CV ELH-18-360, 2019 WL 4689238 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2019) (declining 
to exercise pendent jurisdiction where all federal claims were dismissed). See generally 
Marianist Province of United States v. City of Kirkwood, 944 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2019) 
(declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction where all federal claims were resolved 
before trial considering judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity). 
650 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
which it has original jurisdiction,” or 4) “in exceptional circumstances, 
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”51 
A post-Knick case in federal court with a takings claim concluded 
with the court ruling against the taking claim and finding itself left with 
only state claims, over which it then chose to decline to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction.52  There will be more like this and plaintiffs 
will find themselves headed ultimately to state court, wiping out any 
efficiency that may have been gained in going first to federal court. 
Knick May Only Mean that Takings Plaintiffs Will Be Able to Lose 
Their Cases More Quickly 
This is glib, but glib can be true.  There are few good takings cases 
because the Penn Central53 three-part test is so difficult, and most 
takings claims are added to routine zoning appeals to make the action 
appear more serious.54  As Robert Thomas, author of Sublimating 
Municipal Home Rule and Separation of Powers in Knick v. Township 
of Scott55 in this Issue has said in conversations with me and others: 
“Now we get to go to federal court and lose because Penn Central is 
still the standard.” 
Abstention Will Be an Issue More Often 
This is the other side of pendent jurisdiction.  The dissent in Knick 
cited the Court’s promotion of “practices of certification and 
abstention to put difficult state-law issues in state judges’ hands” and 
then said that “[w]e may as well not have bothered” because the 
“decision sends a flood of complex state-law issues to federal courts.”56  
 
 51. Clark v. City of Williamsburg, No. 17-2002, slip op. at 5–6 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 
2018) (granting jurisdiction over pendent inverse condemnation claim upon 
amendment of the complaint) (internal citations omitted). 
 52. See Funderburk v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., No. 3: 15-cv-04660-JMC, 2019 WL 
3504232, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2019). 
 53. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 54. This is the point made to me and others by Michael M. Berger, who has argued 
four takings cases in the U.S. Supreme Court. He laments that local zoning lawyers 
often toss in a takings claim in their routine appeals. One might guess it is done to 
impress clients or maybe intimidate the government. In the end, it usually does neither. 
Most are not good claims, they do not go anywhere, and they are often abandoned 
along the way. 
 55. Robert Thomas, Sublimating Municipal Home Rule and Separation of Powers 
in Knick v. Township of Scott, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2020). 
 56. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2188–89 (2019); see also Nimer 
v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Tr., 707 F.3d 699, 701 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may 
abstain under the Younger doctrine if three conditions exist: there are state 
proceedings that are (1) currently pending; (2) involve an important state interest; and 
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This remains to be seen.  Certification and abstention are powerful 
tools of federalism, and we should hope that Knick will usher in a new 
era of cooperative federal and state court efforts to divvy up those 
interesting property rights issues that straddle federal and state law. 
There Is No Change in the Tests for a Taking 
Because the tests for a taking are unchanged, there should be no 
noticeable change in the proportion of wins and losses, except to the 
extent that the types of cases brought are different.  As suggested 
above, perhaps more takings cases that are less likely to be winners will 
be brought and, ultimately, lost.57 
The Length of Time to Get to a Final Judgment May Not Be Shorter 
It may take takings claimants just as long as it did before, or longer, 
to get a final judgment.58  For example, take the recent case of First 
State Bank v. City of Elkins59 in the federal district court in the 
Western District of Arkansas and decided shortly before Knick.  There 
was an alleged Fifth Amendment taking wrapped up with other state 
and federal claims.  It became a procedural quagmire, with an 
obviously frustrated judge trying to straighten it out: 
Thus began a now two-year procedural saga during which the parties 
have completely reversed their original positions on litigating these 
issues in federal court.  Along the way, all concerned — certainly 
including this Court — have endeavored to pursue a prudent and 
judicially efficient path forward.  Unfortunately, and with much regret 
 
(3) will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his or her 
constitutional claims.”); Pae v. City of Lawton, No. CIV-16-1198-M, 2017 WL 168910, 
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017) (Pullman abstention rejected in Section 1983 inverse 
condemnation case: “plaintiff has not shown that there is an uncertain issue of state 
law underlying his § 1983 claim, that the state issues are amenable to interpretation 
and such interpretation obviates the need for or substantially narrows the scope of his 
§ 1983 claim, or that an incorrect decision of state law would hinder important state 
law policies. The Court further finds that the unresolved state law issue cited by 
plaintiff — whether defendant’s actions are governed by the Oklahoma Governmental 
Tort Claims Act — is an issue routinely addressed by the courts in the Tenth Circuit 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims.”). See generally R.J. Potvin, 
III Inv. Tr. v. Auburn Water Dist., No. 2:18-CV-00046-NT, 2018 WL 2425926 (D. Me. 
May 25, 2018) (Burford abstention not appropriate in a takings case because relief is 
not discretionary). England reservations will become more important as abstentions 
increase. See Lumbard v. City of Ann Arbor, 913 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 58. How about those self-checkout lines at the grocery? Is it faster for you? Not 
always. 
 59. No. 5:17-CV-5084, 2019 WL 2150388 (W.D. Ark. May 16, 2019). 
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in hindsight, the Court now concludes that it is without jurisdiction, 
and therefore the journey in this forum must end.60 
Availability of Compensation Will Preclude an Injunction to 
Invalidate a Regulation 
The Knick court said that “[g]overnments need not fear that our 
holding will lead federal courts to invalidate their regulations as 
unconstitutional.”61  “As long as an adequate provision for obtaining 
just compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin government’s 
action effecting a taking.”62 
Professor Echeverria describes this as the “most interesting and 
consequential question going forward”: 
The most interesting and consequential question going forward is 
what Knick portends for the ability of property owners to sue to 
enjoin alleged takings that, in the Court’s new terminology, “violate” 
the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s opinion contains absolute 
statements that takings claimants will be limited to compensatory 
relief, and other statements that are more nebulous. For example, the 
Court said, “As long as just compensation remedies are 
available . . . injunctive relief will be foreclosed,” but the Court also 
said, “Given the availability of post-taking compensation, barring the 
government from acting will ordinarily not be appropriate.” To add 
to the uncertainty, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing 
that injunctive relief should sometimes be available in takings 
litigation; he read the opinion of the Court, which he joined, as not 
foreclosing the application of “ordinary remedial principles.”63 
This will be a considerable benefit to local governments in most 
circumstances.  For example, local governments can choose to regulate 
at the cutting edge, requiring developers to use only green energy and 
prohibiting use of any fossil fuels in the interest of slowing global 
climate change.  If the developer sued claiming a taking and a court 
found a taking by over-regulation, the government unilaterally would 
have the choice of abandoning the energy requirement or paying just 
compensation to overcome the taking.  The court would not have the 
power to enjoin the government from its program. 
 
 60. Id. at *1. 
 61. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179. 
 62. Id. However, Justice Thomas in his concurrence rejected the argument that 
regulators should be free of the threat of injunctive relief. Id. at 2180 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 63. Echeverria, supra note 42 (quoting Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
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We are likely to see statements from the decision, such as “[s]o long 
as the property owner has some way to obtain compensation after the 
fact, governments need not fear that courts will enjoin their 
activities,”64 quoted along with citation to the Court’s discussion of 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.65 for the proposition that courts cannot 
invalidate a government action or program so long as the government 
pays for the property rights.  It seems likely that once it is determined 
that a taking is for public use or purpose, injunctive relief will be 
foreclosed.  However, again, as we have seen with other precedents, 
there is much yet to be learned as to how the courts will decide claims 
for injunctive relief. 
More Section 1983 Actions Will Be Brought 
Federal constitutional and statutory claims are typically brought as 
Section 1983 claims, but with the Court’s reference to the statute in 
Knick as the way to bring these claims, litigants will likely make more 
use of it.  In 1871, Congress enacted Section 1983 to provide an 
additional means of redress of Fourteenth Amendment violations.  
Section 1983 provides that an action may be brought in federal court 
against any “person,” which includes local governments, “who, under 
color of” state law: 
[S]ubjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.66 
Claims for Attorney’s Fees Under Section 1988 Will Be Front and 
Center 
Actions applying Knick include the greater use and the threat of 
successful plaintiffs recovering their attorney’s fees under Section 
1988.67  This threat will have a chilling effect on local government 
initiatives, particularly those novel programs where the defensibility of 
public regulation has been untested.  The potential for having to pay 
attorney’s fees has had a profound effect on local government decision 
making in matters where there have been threatened and actual claims 
 
 64. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 65. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). 
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under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA).68 
Local Adjudicatory Review Could Protect Local Governments 
A local adjudicatory process above and beyond the usual variance 
and enforcement appeals available with existing boards of appeal 
would enable the government to grant relief in the form of program 
changes or permit modifications and to award partial compensation as 
an alternative to abandoning what the government wants to achieve.  
It could save everyone from ending up in court.  Also, the finality prong 
of Williamson County is unaffected and must be met.  A takings 
claimant would have to exhaust the local adjudicatory process to reach 
finality, and that process with the potential for a negotiated settlement 
could result in an accommodation for both the property owner and the 
government. 
Ombudsmen and Special Land Use Courts May Be Considered 
Another alternative is to create federal and state takings courts to 
streamline adjudication. Such courts have proven useful in resolving 
takings claims short of trial because they bring to the conflict resolution 
a level of expertise in land-use matters not found in courts of general 
jurisdiction. The decision in Knick, if it does result in increased 
litigation or is even perceived that it will do so, may encourage 
claimants and governments to find ways to resolve claims early on.  By 
way of illustration, Utah has a Property Rights Ombudsman 
authorized to mediate takings claims.69  Connecticut is an example of a 
state that has specialized land-use courts.70 
 
 68. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of 
RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and 
Its Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. L. 195, 255 (2008) (“RLUIPA has had a 
chilling effect on local government’s ability to exercise the police power through zoning 
to ensure that community character is preserved and that the public health, safety, and 
welfare is protected.”). 
 69. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204 (1953). 
 70. John Martinez, A Proposal for Establishing Specialized Federal and State 
“Takings Courts”, 61 ME. L. REV. 467, 489 n.159 (2009). 
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Mediation May Be More Favored 
Most lawyers and planners involved in local land-use disputes will 
agree that mediation is underutilized.71  The threat of attorney’s fees 
with the Section 1983 claims and the direct path to federal court may 
incentivize consideration of mediation. 
Governments May Give More Consideration to Buying Their Way 
Out of the Problem 
The Knick case could have been avoided if the township negotiated 
the voluntary sale and purchase of an easement with definitive metes 
and bounds, restrictions on the terms of access, and the government 
holding the property owner harmless.  Knick had a reasonable concern 
that visitors could be injured walking across the property and that she 
would be liable.72 
Eminent domain, even as unpopular as it is after Kelo, could be used 
if Knick refused to sell.  The cost of the easement, either in a voluntary 
sale or under eminent domain, would have been far less than the cost 
of the litigation.  In the 1994 Supreme Court case of Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, where dedication of a bicycle path along an undevelopable 
floodway was imposed as a condition on the approval of the expansion 
of a hardware and plumbing supply store, the easement was valued at 
$8000, a tiny fraction of what the litigation cost and about 1% of what 
the case ultimately settled for.73 
 
 71. SARA BRONIN & DWIGHT MERRIAM, RATHKOPF’S LAW OF ZONING & 
PLANNING § 31.8 (4th ed. 2019). 
In addition to necessary program modifications to encourage greater 
participation, a change in mindset by all stakeholders involved must develop. 
Despite the increased use of dispute resolution in land use matters, in some 
localities, there is still hesitation on the part of all parties: the public, the 
developers, the planners, the lawyers, the local boards and the courts, to 
participate in a program that is a change from the traditional system. In the 
traditional system, commissioners feel pressure to make decisions quickly, 
and a collaborative approach is viewed as time consuming. Because all parties 
may lack an understanding of how the program works, they are hesitant to 
embrace mediation as an option. 
Id. 
 72. Jessica Gresko, Cemetery Case Puts Property Rights Issue Before the High 
Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/86ec9d89d4d34579b528845f5f8c1642/Cemetery-case-puts-
property-rights-issue-before-high-court [https://perma.cc/5G42-XGBK] (“Knick, 69, 
says her town’s ordinance wouldn’t protect her if people injure themselves on her land 
and sue.”). 
 73. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); E-mail from Jill Gelineau, 
Shareholder, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt PC, to Dwight Merriam (Mar. 8, 2020, 
17:13 EST) (on file with author). 
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Incentives Will Likely Be Considered 
Governments can incentivize the voluntary dedication, in this case, 
of an access easement, by providing some type of relief from 
development restrictions — such as a density bonus or by providing tax 
relief. 
Jury Trials Will Be Had in Section 1983 Cases 
The Court in Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
made clear that there is a right to a jury trial in federal court in these 
Section 1983 cases if there is a claim in excess of $20 or more in 
compensation, but not if only equitable relief is sought.74   The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Knick made clear that in eliminating the state 
compensation prong of the ripeness test it expected claimants to 
proceed under Section 1983.75 
CONCLUSION 
It will be interesting in so many respects to watch how takings 
negotiations and litigation evolve post-Knick.  We must recognize that 
a decision like Knick cannot foretell with any great certainty how it will 
be more fully developed.  That, indeed, is the lesson we have learned 
from other takings decisions, where there has also been an 
overreaction, on all sides. 
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made an 
observation that may be apt here as we enter the post-Knick phase of 
“known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”: 
The message is that there are no “knowns.”  There are things we know 
that we know. There are known unknowns.  That is to say there are 
thing [sic] that we now know we don’t know.  But there are also 
unknown unknowns.  There are things we don’t know we don’t know.  
So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information 
together, and we then say well that’s basically what we see as the 
situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known 
unknowns.  And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown 
unknowns.76 
 
 74. See 526 U.S. 687 (1999); see also MARTIN SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION 5 (3d ed. 2014). 
 75. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2168 (2019). 
 76. Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Press Conference at NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium (June 6, 2002) (official transcript from U.S. 
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)), 
https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm [https://perma.cc/4K2C-U5B4]. 
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This may be a turning point, not great in its impacts, but still a time 
to reconsider how all of the stakeholders conduct themselves.  Would 
it not be good if property owners, developers, neighbors, advocacy 
groups, planners, and government officials took this opportunity to 
find new ways to avoid conflict and to embrace alternative dispute 
resolution? 
